

# SOLLIMS SAMPLER

Targeting Peace & Stability Operations Lessons & Best Practices

Volume 3

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## **FOREWORD**

Welcome to the July 2012 edition of the Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System (SOLLIMS) Lessons Learned “Sampler”. The general structure of the “Sampler” includes (1) an **Introduction** that provides an operational or doctrinal perspective for the content, (2) the Sampler “**Quick Look**” that provides a short description of the topics included within the Sampler and a link to the full text, (3) the primary, topic/issue-focused Stability Operations (SO)-related **Lessons Learned report\***, and (4) links to **additional reports or other references** that are either related to the “focus” topic or that address current, real-world, SO-related challenges.

This lessons-learned compendium contains just a sample – thus the title of “sampler” – of the observations, insights, and lessons related to **Reconciliation** available in the SOLLIMS data repository. These observations are worth sharing with military commanders and their staffs, as well as civilian practitioners with a Stability Operations-related mission / function – those currently deployed into conflict environments, those planning to deploy, the institutional Army, policy makers and other international civilian and military leaders at the national and theater level.

Lessons Format. Each lesson is provided in the form of an Observation and Recommendation (O&R). The “O & R” follows a standard format:

- Title (Topic)
- Observation
- Discussion
- Recommendation
- Implications
- Event Description

Occasionally you may see a “Comments” section. This is used by the author of the “O&R” or a Lesson Manager to provide additional personal perspective or to identify related references on the Observation. The “Event Description” section provides context for the Observation in that it identifies the source or event from which the content was developed.

You will also note that a number is displayed in parentheses next to the title of each lesson / observation. This number is hyper-linked to the actual O&R within the SOLLIMS database; click on the highlighted O&R number to display the O&R entry and access any attachments (references, images, files) that are included within SOLLIMS for this O&R. **Note, you must have an account and be logged into SOLLIMS in order to display the SOLLIMS data entry and access / download attachments.**



If you have not registered on SOLLIMS, the links in the reports will take you to the login or the registration page. Take a few short minutes to register for an account in order to take advantage of the many features of SOLLIMS and to access the stability operations related products referenced in the report. We encourage you to take the time now to provide us with your perspective as related to a single observation / lesson in this report, or to the overall value of this “Sampler” as a reference or guide for you and your unit/organization and staff. **By using the “Perspectives” text entry box that is found at the end of each O&R – seen when you open the O&R in your browser – you can enter your own personal comments and observations on this O&R.** We welcome your input. We encourage you to become a regular contributor to the SOLLIMS Community of Interest !!!

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At PKSOI we continually strive to improve the services and products we provide the global stability operations community. We invite you to use our web site at [ <http://pksoi.army.mil> ] and the many functions of the SOLLIMS online environment [ <https://sollims.pksoi.org> ] to help us identify issues and resolve problems – we welcome your comments and insights.

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***\*All reports in the “Sampler” are generated by the SOLLIMS Lessons Report Builder tool.***



Khost Provincial Governor Abdul Naeemi and ISAF Force Reintegration Cell Director Major General Phil Jones address the Khost Provincial Peace Council at the governor's residence 10 Aug 2011. The council is made up of key village elders who work with former fighters on their issues and grievances as part of the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program. (Photo by U.S. Air Force CPT David Tomiyama)

## **INTRODUCTION**

Welcome to the July 2012 edition of the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) Lessons Learned “Sampler”. The focus for this edition is on **Reconciliation**.

*"First, looking at it in time, the violence that has been done in Iraq that has deepened divisions and fears goes back to 1968 when the Ba'aths took power – and obviously it didn't end in 2003 given the sectarian violence we saw in 2006. So there is significant psychic damage to be overcome here . . .*

*(<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Btg5nydi1IA>, Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker testifying to Congress, 10 September 2007)*

**Reconciliation** – or the process of developing a mutual conciliatory accommodation between antagonistic or formerly antagonistic persons or groups – is a strategic imperative. In order for peacekeeping and stability operations to have a long-term impact, groups involved in past violence must reconcile. Deep-seated grievances may linger between the government and certain groups of citizens, or between religious groups, ethnic groups, geographic communities, or socio-economic classes. Often, the involved parties/factions can be grouped into many of the aforementioned categories. No matter the categories, achieving reconciliation has proven to be complex business.

Post-conflict reconciliation is particularly challenging. Countries with a history of conflict have a predisposition to return to violence, often due to unchanged circumstances and loyalties of former militants. In order to integrate former militants back into civil society, some governments have adopted policies that provide ex-combatants with training and employment opportunities – often under Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs. Detractors claim that such policies reward former criminals, while proponents argue that such policies provide incentives for ex-combatants to not restart a conflict.

In addition to DDR programs, U.S./coalition forces have attempted to achieve reconciliation through various other means, such as by sponsoring shuras with reconciliation agendas. In Iraq, for instance, shuras were utilized to bring together Shi'a and Sunni militants to create sustainable peace and bolster ties between the groups. To achieve national reconciliation, some nations and international organizations have used Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs). First used in South Africa after the apartheid, TRCs offer perpetrators an opportunity to admit to past misdeeds. Some crimes are forgiven while others are prosecuted. The main goal of TRCs is national healing. TRCs have been used in many other nations, including Liberia, Morocco, Sierra Leone, and Chile.

This Sampler seeks to explore issues involved in reconciliation efforts. Key thoughts and lessons are captured in the [Conclusion](#) paragraph.

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## **Sampler “Quick Look” – Reconciliation**

**Click on [\[Read More ...\]](#) to go to Sampler topic.**

- In northern Iraq, during the 2007-2008 timeframe, Multi-National Division North (MND North) developed its own DDR program in the absence of any nationally-based program – to reach out to, and to reconcile with, insurgent fighters... [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- Establishing a truth commission can greatly facilitate peace and stability and the transition process in a post-conflict society... [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- The United States' supported Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was created to prosecute the abuses of former Liberian President Charles Taylor and his accomplices for war crimes. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- This paper proposes that the African Union use the "Panel of the Wise," a sub-office of the Peace and Security Council, to establish a formal mediation unit. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- The integration of non-state military forces / para-military forces into the state's security profile is seen to be an element of the wider post-conflict peacebuilding and statebuilding process. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- The United Nations' long experience in peacekeeping operations have shown that conflict resolution theory has direct application in field operations and should be one of the methods considered and used in contemporary operations. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) actions launched in Liberia at its "golden hour" (mid-2003 to 2005) were absolutely critical for post-conflict recovery... [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- Truth commissions are bodies created to investigate a history of violations and to help societies that have suffered political violence or internal conflict to come to terms with the past... [\[Read More ...\]](#)

3 July 2012

**Subject: SOLLIMS REPORT – RECONCILIATION**

**1. GENERAL**

Post-conflict reconciliation is an absolute necessity for long-term stability. Without reconciliation, grievances are bound to persist between formerly antagonistic persons and groups, leaving significant potential for reemergence of violence/instability. Developing and implementing effective plans and processes for reconciliation – to move people from a divided past toward a shared future – is a challenge that must be met with great persistence, as noted in many of the lessons that follow.

**2. OBSERVATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS**

**a. TOPIC. DDR Initiative in Northern Iraq ( [774](#) )**

**Observations.**

Coalition-led, regionally-based Defense, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) programs can provide viable opportunities for attaining reconciliation with insurgent fighters, as evidenced in northern Iraq in the 2007-2008 timeframe. However, such regional initiatives can run into a number of challenges and lose momentum – unless a comprehensive nationally-managed DDR program emerges.

**Discussion.**

In northern Iraq, during the 2007-2008 timeframe, Multi-National Division North (MND North) developed its own DDR program in the absence of any nationally-based program – to reach out to, and to reconcile with, insurgent fighters willing to stop fighting and rejoin society as noncombatants. In this MND North program, the transitioning insurgents/DDR petitioners were told, upfront, at receiving/screening stations that they would need to sign a pledge stating that they would cease attacks against the Iraqi Government, Iraqi Security Forces, Iraqi civilians, and coalition forces. Also, they were required to provide their biometric data – fingerprints, height/weight, eye color. In return, the coalition forces gave them the commitment that they shall no longer "target" these individuals – as long as they did not return to insurgent activity. At the initial screening, MND North briefed petitioners on what was expected of them



under the agreements, then allowed them to return home to make their decisions. Upon the second visit, the agreements were signed/executed, weapons were turned in, and individuals were also asked to provide any information about past and current insurgent activity.

In MND North, a "reconciliation cell" was set up within each headquarters – down to brigade level. This reconciliation cell helped coordinate the processing of DDR petitioners, facilitated reconciliation, and synchronized agreements, actions, and information flow. One of the task forces within MND North – Task Force Iron – found that its "reconciliation cell" was most effective through participation from the task force's Intelligence Section and its Targeting Section, as well as through coordination with its Information Operations (IO), Engineering, and Civil-Military Operations personnel. Task Force Iron's "reconciliation cell" participated in various task force working groups – intelligence, effects, plans, and IO working groups – to ensure synchronization of DDR efforts with the task force's other efforts and objectives. "Reconciliation-specific coordination meetings" (held every other week) also incorporated local government and security force personnel – so that host nation personnel could be intimately involved in the screening and tracking processes.

Information Operations conducted in concert with conventional operations proved critical to gaining and building participation in the DDR program. When conventional operations targeted insurgent fighters, they were immediately followed by an increase in IO about the DDR program. This helped send a strong, often effective, message that if insurgent fighters would not give up their arms, then Iraqi and coalition forces would continue to pursue them. This two-pronged effort – lethal operations followed by IO – was instrumental in reducing insurgent fighters' willingness to continue the insurgency in northern Iraq – convincing many to opt instead for the DDR program.

However, the lack of a nationally-based program somewhat hindered the momentum of the DDR program in MND North. For one, local Iraqi authorities in northern Iraq could implement the "cessation of targeting" agreements in their areas of operation/jurisdiction, but they could not guarantee (to petitioners) that these agreements would be honored in neighboring areas / other parts of Iraq. Second, without a nationally-based program to define who was eligible for such amnesty in the first place, local Iraqi authorities had no guidelines as to which actions (conducted by insurgent fighters) were too serious to grant a "cessation of targeting." Iraqi authorities and MND-N forces together dealt with this issue on a case-by-case basis. For instance, they would allow fighters into the DDR program if they had not participated in any recent insurgent activity/attacks and if they were not identified in current Iraqi arrest warrants. Lastly, without a nationally-based DDR program tied to nationally-managed employment programs (to reintegrate former fighters into society), local Iraqi authorities and coalition forces were left with limited options for employing former fighters.

They had to adapt to slowly developing regional employment opportunities, training programs, and grant/loan programs.

### **Recommendation.**

1. "Reconciliation cells" should be established at brigade level for the management of DDR activities. Reconciliation cells should partner/work closely with HN authorities. Reconciliation cells should include membership/participation from Intelligence, Targeting, and IO sections.
2. Army organizations/task forces should use Information Operations to convey messages to insurgent fighters about the availability and benefits of the DDR program, and should consider surging such messages immediately upon conclusion of lethal operations.
3. International community members and U.S. Government agencies involved in stability operations should insist on a HN/nationally-based DDR program – so that DDR activities can be conducted with legitimacy and consistency throughout the HN.

### **Implications.**

Without a nationally-managed DDR program, regionally-based DDR programs will face numerous challenges (e.g., eligibility standards, amnesty issues, abilities to implement agreements across borders/jurisdictions, and opportunities for employment). Building momentum / increasing participation in DDR will prove difficult, and gaining reconciliation with combatants may be jeopardized.

### **Event Description.**

This observation is based on the article "[The Road to Reconciliation: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration](#)," by Captain Matthew Q. Rodano, New York Army National Guard, in Military Review, September-October 2011.



## **b. TOPIC. Sierra Leone – Transition through Truth and Reconciliation Commission ( [683](#) )**

### **Observations.**

Establishing a truth commission can greatly facilitate peace and stability and the transition process in a post-conflict society – since this commission helps to identify the causes of recent conflict, what actually transpired during recent conflict, what can be done to aid victims of recent conflict, and what needs to change for overall stability. A truth commission can also aid the government (which may be a new government) in establishing a foundation on which to build legitimacy – by promoting democratic ideals, accountability, the rule of law, equality, and social justice. In post-conflict Sierra Leone (2002 and beyond), the activities of the truth commission demonstrate the value of this entity to the transition process.

### **Discussion.**

The Lome Peace Agreement, signed on 7 July 1999, between the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) Government, resulted in the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The TRC was sanctioned by an act of parliament in Sierra Leone – the TRC Act of 2000. The TRC Act of 2000 called for the establishment of the TRC to "create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone from the beginning of the conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement [1999], to address impunity, to respond to the needs of the victims, to promote healing and reconciliation, and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered."

The Commission was principally funded by the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Canada, and the European Union. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) served as the project coordinator and controller of funds for the TRC. The overall budget for the TRC was set at \$4.6 million, and it covered an 18-month period of work.

The TRC was actually one component of a dual approach to transitional justice, with the other component being the Special Court for Sierra Leone. The purpose of the Special Court for Sierra Leone was to try persons who bore the greatest responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The role of the TRC, on the other hand, was to examine the causes of the war, human rights violations, and the role played by foreign actors, as well as to provide a forum for victims, to provide assistance to victims, and to enable communities to reconcile. The TRC was tasked to produce an impartial record of the conflict and atrocities committed against the civilian population.

The TRC completed its work in 2004. It documented its findings and recommendations in its TRC Report. This report captured the stories/experiences recounted by both victims and perpetrators. This report also acknowledged the many atrocities committed against the civilian population. In this report, the TRC provided a list of recommendations calling for: the "protection of human rights," establishment of the rule of law, improved security services, promotion of good governance, anti-corruption efforts, actions to address women's and children's issues, promotion of regional integration and unity, accountability of the proceeds from mineral resources, building of a national justice system, reparations, reconciliation activities, and a national vision for going forward. Each recommendation identified imperative actions (to be done immediately), goals to work towards (near term), and ideas for serious consideration (over time). For example, in the "protection of human rights" category, the imperative action was "Enshrine human dignity as a fundamental right in the Constitution," the goal to work towards was "Compulsory human rights education in schools, army, police, and judicial services," and the idea for serious consideration was "Creation of a new constitution for Sierra Leone." The TRC also recommended that its report be widely disseminated among the people.

The work of the TRC contributed to reconciliation, but not to the degree anticipated. Polls and interviews were conducted in 2006 with regard to the work of the TRC. There was general consensus among those interviewed in 2006 that the TRC had been an effective platform for reconciliation, although some believed that the TRC's scope had been somewhat limited by the parallel existence of the Special Court of Sierra Leone. Most of those interviewed were very appreciative that a neutral body – the TRC – had been appointed to conduct the examination of the conflict and the atrocities committed, and to provide society with a means for reconciliation and reparation. However, most also believed that victims still had not been compensated and that the TRC's recommendations still needed to be implemented.

In fact, the TRC's impact had been diminished by a number of factors. First, although the TRC Report was supposed to be widely disseminated, the printed version of the report was not made available to the average citizen - six years after publication. No government institution had been formally charged to do the dissemination. Second, reparations were not paid to victims. Individuals victimized were not provided reparations, and affected communities were not adequately compensated. Some community work was done – roads damaged during the conflict were repaired, local government bodies were reinstated, and some clinics and schools were reconstructed – however, there were significant shortfalls with regard to basic amenities, employment, and infrastructure needs in 2010. Third, the international community did not provide immediate support for follow-up programs once the TRC produced its report in 2004. It was not until 11 December 2006 that a Human Rights Commission (HRCSL) was "inaugurated." This was a statutory body funded partly by the United Nations



Peace Building Fund and partly by the Government of Sierra Leone – charged with the responsibility to maintain human rights and to serve as a follow-up to the TRC. However, the HRCSL did not become fully operational until 2008. Hence, most of the TRC's recommendations have not yet been implemented, and many of the discrepancies and causes of conflict remain to be addressed. That said, the work of the truth commission has been widely recognized and appreciated by the general population, allowing reconciliation to occur and providing the government with a foundation to build legitimacy, as well as a path ahead.

### **Recommendation.**

1. Establish a truth commission in post-conflict societies to help identify the causes of recent conflict, to provide recommendations for aiding the victims, and to provide a foundation for governance and justice.
2. Ensure that the report of the truth commission is widely disseminated. Charge a government institution with the task of disseminating this report, countrywide. Ensure adequate information infrastructure is in place to accommodate dissemination of the report. Consider including the report in school curricula.
3. Ensure that reparations are paid to the victims, or, where individual compensation is not possible, compensate their affected communities through reconstruction of facilities for essential services – such as basic health care, education, and security.
4. Provide sufficient financial assistance to allow for timely execution of the truth commission's recommendations. Establish a follow-up institution or committee to ensure that the major recommendations are carried out.

### **Implications.**

Failure to establish a truth commission and to provide reparations to victims of conflict, or at least to their communities, can cause dissatisfaction among victimized populations, which may in turn be harmful to a fragile peace and to governmental legitimacy.

### **Event Description.**

This observation is based on the article "[The International Community and Post-War Reconciliation in Africa: A Case Study of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission](#)," by Proscovia Svard, African Journal on Conflict Resolution, Volume 10, Number 1, 2010.



### c. TOPIC. Transitional Justice in Liberia ( [481](#) )

#### **Observations.**

The United States' supported Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was created to prosecute the abuses of former Liberian President Charles Taylor and his accomplices for war crimes. The country of Liberia has 3.4 million people and is currently undergoing a post-conflict transition and peace-building process after it experienced two civil wars in only ten years. The latter conflict spread in 2000, after several minor border incursions in 1999. It pitted the forces of Charles Taylor, elected president in 1997 after Liberia's first civil war (1989-1997), against two armed anti-Taylor rebel groups: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). The war led to an extreme deterioration in political, economic, humanitarian, and human rights conditions. The Liberian civil war also affected neighboring states, which accepted Liberian refugees and, in some cases, hosted anti-Taylor forces. The Taylor regime also sponsored or facilitated acts of armed aggression against its neighbors, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire.

#### **Discussion.**

Although no war crimes special tribunal was established in Liberia, in late February 2006 President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf inaugurated the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which the transitional legislature proposed/created one year prior, in 2005. President Sirleaf also pledged to support and strengthen the TRC, which has a mandate to investigate crimes and human rights abuses committed from 1979 until 2003.

The TRC formally began operations in early June 2006, but did not begin to collect testimony until October 2006 and had to halt operations about a month later due to financial shortfalls. In mid-2007, after having undertaken a fund-raising effort, it launched a multi-month project to collect testimony from the substantial Liberian community living in the United States, in part supported by Minnesota-based Advocates for Human Rights and Northwestern University's Center for Human Rights Law, which had begun to collect statements from the diaspora in early 2007 for the TRC. In October 2007, the TRC re-launched field hearings in Liberia after receiving assistance from the U.N. Development Program and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), among other donors. In FY2006, USAID provided \$.5 million in support to the TRC.

The SCSL, which continues prosecution of the 11-count indictment against Charles Taylor and other trials and activities in support of the TRC, is facing a severe funding shortfall that could critically impair its ability to complete judicial activities and trial operations on schedule. The court also faces the prospect of difficulties in financing long-term residual activities, which are expected to pertain to witness protection; archival activities, including record-keeping associated with future legal and financial documents of the court; a residual registrar's capacity required for enforcing court sentences and maintaining relations with countries hosting imprisoned convicts of the SCSL; legal decision-making regarding future appeals, conditions of prisoner treatment and contempt proceedings; and, financial matters pertaining to such activities.

Although currently facing funding challenges, the SCSL has achieved several milestones in the administration of international justice, as the first international court to:

- Indict a sitting African head of state for war crimes;
- Derive its funding from voluntary contributions;
- Be established in the country where the alleged crimes at issue took place; and
- Issue rulings on the recruitment and use of children in the context of a war crimes trial and the treatment of forced marriage as a war crime separate and distinct from crimes of sexual slavery and rape.

The peace accord was signed on August 18, 2003, after months of international mediation. It was facilitated by two events: (1) Charles Taylor's resignation of the presidency and departure from Liberia on August 11, after he was granted political asylum in Nigeria, and (2) the early-August deployment of an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) military intervention force, the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL). ECOMIL, with extensive U.S. and United Nations (U.N.) assistance, deployed to Liberia to end heavy fighting and alleviate a worsening humanitarian crisis in the wake of a failed June 2003 cease-fire.

ECOMIL was tasked with monitoring and securing the cease-fire, enabling the delivery of relief aid and preparing the way for the U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). UNMIL, first authorized by the U.N. Security Council on September 19, 2003, deployed to Liberia on October 1, 2003, two weeks before the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) took office on October 14.

ECOMIL was dissolved and its military forces absorbed into UNMIL, which carries out diverse peacekeeping, civilian policing, and socio-economic assistance functions in support of Liberia's transition process. UNMIL has also assumed responsibility from the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) for providing a military guard force for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, discussed below; UNAMSIL's mandate ended on December 31, 2005. UNMIL

currently has an authorized force strength of 14,875 military personnel and 1,240 police. As of early August 2007, it had a total force size of 14,141 troops and 1,180 police officers, composed of personnel from 64 countries.

As of late March 2007, U.S. uniformed personnel in UNMIL included six troops, eight police officers, and seven military observers. In September 2005, the Security Council requested that UNMIL leaders recommend a force drawdown plan for UNMIL, including specific benchmarks and a planned schedule in a March 2006 report. The report, the Tenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia (S/2006/159, March 14, 2006), found that there was a need for a two-year “consolidation phase,” but that it is “too early for a major drawdown of UNMIL.” During the “consolidation period,” UNMIL would implement an “adjusted mandate” defined by an 11-point agenda of “priority tasks.” These tasks include: “assisting the Government in completing the reintegration and rehabilitation program for ex-combatants,” “facilitating the completion of the return and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons,” and “assisting the Government in rebuilding the culture of respect for human rights and the rule of law.”

### **Recommendation.**

In August 2007, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon recommended that a drawdown process linked to attainment of several core benchmarks be initiated. UNMIL has implemented measures to prevent, detect, investigate, and punish acts of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), in line with recent reforms and renewed U.N.-wide regulations regarding sexual conduct, following abuses in several U.N. peacekeeping missions around the world, including in Liberia. He also stated that the conduct of elections in Sierra Leone in 2007 and in Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire in 2008 “are important contextual benchmarks that need to be taken into account when deciding on the timing of adjustments to UNMIL troop deployments.”

The recommended benchmarks for Liberia’s recovery post-conflict are the following:

- Multi-focal improvements in police operational capacity
- The completion of a national security strategy and architecture and implementation thereof nationwide by December 2008
- The training and operationalization of two newly trained military battalions by September 2008 and September 2009, respectively
- The restoration of the rule of law and achievement of increased operational capacity by government agencies throughout Liberia

The United States’ policy benchmarks for Liberia during the Bush administration were the following:



- Prevent destabilizing factors, such as political and social exclusion and competition over resources, from again leading to a re-emergence of violent conflict
- Help Liberia to rebuild its economy and create sustainable, long term, trade and market-driven economic growth.
- Strengthen and help rebuild Liberia's government structures and processes, and bolster the rule of law.

### **Implications.**

If the SCSL and TRC had not been created, and if a concerted effort to establish the rule of law had not been pursued, then reconciliation may have fallen short in Liberia, with adverse consequences for long-term stability.

### **Event Description.**

This observation and recommendation is an 'extract' from the report "[Liberia's Post War Recovery: Key Issues and Development](#)," by Nicholas Cook, Specialist in African Affairs, Congressional Research Service, February 19, 2009.

### **Comments.**

A related report, which outlines tasks and benchmarks for UNMIL related to reconciliation and the rule of law, is the "[Tenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia](#)," United Nations Security Council, 14 March 2006.



### **d. TOPIC. Establishing Mediation Unit in the African Union ( [584](#) )**

### **Observations.**

This paper ("[Mediation and the African Union's Panel of the Wise](#)") proposes that the African Union use the "Panel of the Wise," a sub-office of the Peace and Security Council, to establish a formal mediation unit. Mediation efforts have proven to be effective in resolving major conflicts in Africa and around the world.

## **Discussion.**

Although this observation is based on a 2005 paper, the ideas and concepts for expert mediation are applicable today and is a proven method to resolve conflicts, not only in Africa but in other regions of the world.

This Crisis States Research Centre paper examines the strategic and institutional dimensions of mediation. It argues that international mediation should involve confidence-building rather than coercive diplomacy and should be pursued (by highly proficient and experienced mediators) as a specialized activity. The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), should establish the Panel of the Wise, a sub-structure of the Council, as an expert mediation unit that is independent of states.

Poorly conducted mediation can exacerbate conflict. International mediators diminish the prospect of ending conflict when they deviate from the principles of confidence-building mediation. The key to effective mediation lies in understanding, managing and transforming the political and psychological dynamics of serious conflict that make parties fiercely resistant to negotiations. Three strategic implications result from this emphasis on trust:

- Mediators should not be partisan. Through the presence and support of a trusted third party, mediation can provide a relatively calm and safe space for the adversaries to articulate and explore ways of meeting their respective concerns. A mediator's acceptability and effectiveness may be greatly diminished by partisanship.
- Mediators should not engage in punitive action. A mediating body will almost certainly lose the confidence and cooperation of a party against whom it threatens or applies sanctions or military force. Punitive action destroys the mediator's credibility as an honest broker, makes the mediator a party to the conflict and undermines the peace process in numerous ways.
- The parties must own the settlement. If a mediator attempts to thrust on the parties a solution that is inimical to their interests, they are likely to conclude that the mediator has sided with their opponent. Agreements that are reached under duress will have scant value in the absence of a genuine commitment to peace and reconciliation.

Peacemaking by multinational organizations is often prejudiced by the partisan interests of member states. In the case of the African Union, a structural solution to this problem would lie in establishing an expert mediation unit that functions independently of states. Independence would allow the mediators to engage in low-profile preventive diplomacy long before a conflict reached crisis proportions and attracted the attention of plenary organs. Their flexibility would not be constrained by vested interests and they could more easily make contact with parties that had acquired pariah status. Most importantly, their impartiality

and lack of coercive power would make their efforts less threatening to the parties.

- It would be a mistake to appoint retired heads of state and other national leaders to the Panel of the Wise. The Panel's credibility should derive from the mediation expertise of its members. The Panel should thus comprise people with a proven track record as mediators.
- Without sufficient resources, the Panel of Wise will not be able to perform its functions properly, but human resources are a key consideration.
- Panel activities could include: preventive diplomacy; facilitating dialogue through shuttle diplomacy; preparing for, mediating in and managing formal negotiations; and, assisting in dispute-resolution during the implementation of settlements.

In January 2007, the African Union AU Assembly appointed a number of distinguished African personalities to the Panel of the Wise for a period of three years. They included:

- Salim Ahmed Salim, former Secretary-General of the Organisation of African Unity, representing the East African region.
- Brigalia Bam, Chairperson of the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa, representing the Southern Africa region.
- Ahmed Ben Bella former President of Algeria, representing the North Africa region.
- Elisabeth Pognon, President of the Constitutional Court of Benin, representing West Africa.
- Miguel Trovada, former President of Sao Tomé and Príncipe, representing Central Africa.

The Peace and Security Council subsequently adopted a set of detailed modalities for the functioning of the Panel of the Wise at its 100th meeting on 12 November 2007, which notes that the document shall be revised following the operationalization of the Panel and on a regular basis thereafter. The adoption of the modalities was followed by the official inauguration of the Panel in Addis Ababa on 18 December 2007. The Panel held its inaugural meeting in Addis Ababa on 20 February 2008, during which it adopted its first annual program of work.

In order to be effective the Panel of the Wise needs a robust mediation support unit within the African Union Commission. It also requires significant input from qualified political officers who have experience in bilateral and multilateral negotiation settings. Without such a staff complement it will be difficult for the Panel to conduct its affairs of analyzing and mapping conflicts and determining who the key parties, secondary actors and spoilers are in a given situation.

The United Nations already has a mediation capacity (in the Department of Political Affairs):

- A specialized Mediation Support Unit (MSU) was established in 2006 and serves as a central repository for peacemaking experience and a clearing house for lessons learned and best practices. The unit coordinates training for mediators and provides them with advice on UN standards and operating procedures.
- The Mediation Support Standby Team, established in 2008, is a five-person expert team that can be deployed on short notice to assist UN and non-UN mediation efforts around the world. Their expertise covers a range of issues that arise frequently in peace talks (e.g., mediation strategy to security arrangements, transitional justice and human rights, power-sharing, and constitution-making).

### **Recommendation.**

1. The African Union should establish a mediation unit that resides in the Panel of the Wise. The mediation unit should be adequately resourced with mediation experts and a professional staff as described in the discussion.
2. The UN and other multinational organizations (such as the European Union) should support the AU and other regional organizations with professional training, advice, mentoring, and financial assistance.
3. Regional organizations should establish a mediation capacity with a dedicated and specialized mediation unit.

### **Implications.**

#### **If recommendations are adopted:**

- More resources will have to be allocated to mediators and support staff. This may require outside assistance, especially for the AU.
- Mediators and support staff will expand relationships between potential implementers, peacebuilders, and other networks. Mediators and support staff will become more familiar with interested parties, especially if they become involved in conflict prevention instead of later when a crisis or conflict erupts.
- Mediators will have to work with organizations and individuals responsible for implementing peace accords/agreements or post-conflict activities. Mediators must ensure their work does not have unintended consequences during peacebuilding efforts. Mediators must also coordinate to ensure there is little to no gap between agreement and implementation.



- Mediators will have to ensure unresolved issues are acknowledged by conflict parties and will not hinder compliance with an agreement(s).
- Mediation support staff will have to develop and maintain their lessons learned and best practices for historical purposes and share to the community of interest.
- More formal and expanded forums will be established as the mediation community grows and gains more visibility in peacekeeping.

If recommendations are not adopted:

- Mediation efforts will be on an ad hoc basis, although the United Nations has a mediation staff. A full-time support staff can provide required administrative and logistical assistance, research, and analysis before and during negotiations.
- Without a formal structure, mediators will require time to gain knowledge/ understanding of the conflict, background, and current situation, as well as to build a communication network with all applicable parties and actors.

**Event Description.**

This observation is based on the paper "[Mediation and the African Union's Panel of the Wise](#)," Discussion Paper no. 10, by Laurie Nathan, Crisis States Reasearch Center, Development Studies Institute (DESTIN), London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK, June 2005.



**e. TOPIC. Security Sector Reform: Post-conflict Integration ( [536](#) )**

**Observations.**

The integration of non-state military forces / para-military forces into the state's security profile is seen to be an element of the wider post-conflict peacebuilding and statebuilding process. However, there is no single, "template solution" for implementing military integration during the Security Sector Reform process. We have come to realize that there are many approaches and solutions for achieving effective, but not over-whelming, integration of multiple "military force components" into a single military force as part of post-conflict peacekeeping and stability operations.

## **Discussion.**

Military integration during Security Sector Reform is a complex and diverse process. However, there are consistent themes used in many of the case studies conducted for this research. The primary case studies were from Bosnia, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and The Philippines. Secondary case studies included Angola, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Chad, Chechnya, Djibuti, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Ossetia, Haiti, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Rwanda, and Uganda. These case studies provide key issues and lessons from academic and policy papers focused on issues related to the integration of non-state and government military forces, as part of a wider peace settlement following civil war.

An example of successful integration is illustrated by Mozambique. The fully implemented integration process in the peace settlement required government troops and Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) forces to be integrated in order to form a new national army. Despite a delayed start, demobilization of the old "national army," as an element of the integration process, proved so successful that the country's President announced that conscription would be necessary to get the new, integrated Mozambique Democratic Armed Forces up to full strength.

Partial implementation is a common outcome of integration efforts as highlighted by Angola. The 1991 peace accords from that civil war called for the creation of a 40,000 man national army, evenly divided between the government troops and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) troops. Although the integration process was concluded in 1998, and despite claims of full demobilization, it was reported that UNITA still had 25,000-30,000 fully equipped and mobilized troops.

## **Recommendation.**

The following are the Lessons Identified in the research report "[Security Sector Reform: Post-conflict Integration](#)":

1. In conflicts resulting in political defeat or stalemate, where neither military force achieved a decisive victory, a 1+1=3 formula could usefully be applied. This indicates that two separate forces integrating should result in a new, more effective third force. It is important that neither the existing military structures, personnel nor cultures should dominate the new force.
2. The political solution to ending the conflict is the most pressing contextual factor in which the military integration will be implemented. The integration process will more likely be successful if it closely reflects the prevailing political solution.

3. A military integration process requires parties to a conflict, and individuals engaged in the conflict, to forgo the instruments that are seen to provide for their security. Therefore intense feelings of insecurity and resistance are likely to emerge around the military integration issue.
4. Progress on military integration greatly enhances the wider process of reconciliation. Military integration constitutes credible signals of conciliatory intent among former enemies. Implementation serves as a concrete signal of a genuine commitment to peace as signatories to an agreement prove willing to endure the costs associated with both compromising their original war aims and withstanding potential challenges from within their own groups.
5. Poorly conceived and implemented military integration processes are more likely to fail. Failure of military integration has a disproportionately negative effect upon the wider peace process.
6. Military integration is often viewed by individual combatants primarily through an economic or livelihood perspective. In cases where military integration could not provide a security guarantee, it was successful by achieving an economic objective.
7. Military integration should be placed within a larger state-building plan, incorporating a National Defense Strategy that informs (= and determines) the role and structure of the military. The military should be conceived within a sustainable state revenue projection.
8. The degree of success achieved within any given context is often shown to be contingent upon the capacities of structures and bodies responsible for military integration.
9. Inclusive military integration processes that are planned and managed by bodies comprising representation of all parties to the conflict are likely to be successful.
10. Police forces, and other uniformed services, can often be misused as a political safety valve for ex-combatants; these individuals are not required by, nor should they be selected by, the military integration process to join the military.
11. A comprehensive military integration process should include planning for the individual selection, education and training of personnel for the police, as a separate process to the military.
12. Military integration process should be conceived and planned with a specific civilian reintegration component, for those individuals not selected for military service.

13. The civilian reintegration programs should be planned and managed by the same body responsible for military integration.

14. International assistance can greatly enhance the prospects for successfully achieving military integration processes. The most commonly witnessed assistance program incorporates flexible 'process' support, and technical military training.

15. International actors can play vital arbitration roles, as well as technical roles, if invited to do so by both parties to the military integration process; the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) in South Africa being the exemplary case.

### **Implications.**

- The worst case scenario of no military integration is that opposing factions resume open aggression and conflict. The opposing parties would once again have to be convinced to come back to negotiations or mediation to determine points of contention and problems. The peace process may have to start from a clean slate or with major modification to previous accords.

- Another scenario is that military integration is delayed or the pace of integration is slow. The risk is that some members of the conflict parties lose patience with the pace of integration or even the peace accords themselves. This would cause soldiers and rebels to leave or break away to form separate groups not included in the original peace negotiations.

- Military integration is another way to provide jobs thereby reducing unemployment. Lack or delaying integration causes unemployment and risks people becoming disillusioned with the process and not supporting the peace process. Related to this is rejecting former combatants from joining the new military organization. Again, many people may become unemployed creating yet another potential threat to the overall peace process.

- Another scenario is that opposing parties form separate security or police units outside of the agreed military integration accords. Again, this creates mistrust and is a problem to the overall peace process. Additionally, this becomes a problem in trying to build a single, national, professional military and police force and implement standards for selection, education, and training.

- Military integration may ultimately depend on the resources that are committed to accomplish it. Most resources will come from the host government and international support. It is important that adequate resources be available for the development of the integration plan and to maintain the new military structure after integration is complete. Inadequate resources may delay the eventual integration or result in the new military structure having poor leadership, lacking a



training strategy /training resources, with little to no standards – leading to an imbalanced and ineffective organization.

### **Event Description.**

This observation is based on the research paper "[Security Sector Reform: Post-conflict Integration](#)," by Mark Knight, August 2009, commissioned by the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR). The views presented in the paper are those of the authors only and not the necessarily GFN-SSR.



#### **f. TOPIC. Conflict Resolution in Peacekeeping ( [580](#) )**

### **Observations.**

The United Nations' long experience in peacekeeping operations has shown that conflict resolution theory has direct application in field operations and should be one of the methods considered and used in contemporary operations.

### **Discussion.**

At the time of this observation, the paper upon which it is based, "[Hawks and Doves: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution](#)," is almost six years old. However, the concepts and ideas from it remain applicable today and perhaps in the future as well. The nature and complexity of contemporary conflict requires non-hostile actions rather than use of force from peacekeepers or other/conflict parties.

This paper focuses on how conflict resolution can help United Nations peacekeepers manage conflict, reduce violence, and further peacebuilding efforts. Although the points and lessons outlined in this paper were gleaned from UN operations, they may be applicable to peacekeeping operations conducted by other organizations as well. The paper further outlines how peacekeeping doctrine is continually developed and refined in response to ideas and critiques from organizations and personnel involved in UN operations. Rather than engaging directly in the debate on whether force should be used in peacekeeping operations and, if so, to what degree, this paper focuses on the contribution that conflict resolution theory can make to evolving concepts of peacekeeping and to practical application.

## **Recommendation.**

Nine points were identified in the paper and revolve around the central idea that “support of the population” is an essential prerequisite for successful peacekeeping operations:

1. The local population should perceive the mission and its staff as being impartial. When the parties to a conflict attempt to use the mission or some of its staff to their own advantage, as they often do, the mission and its information component must be able to maintain and project its image of impartiality and neutrality. The effort to maintain impartiality, however, must not promote inaction. On the contrary, peacekeepers must discharge their tasks firmly and objectively.
2. The United Nations must also demonstrate a commitment to the principles of transparency and accountability in its activities. It must not be perceived as being above the law. Designating an ombudsman, or a focal point, to consider the grievances of the local population against the mission or its staff could be considered.
3. Respect for the cultural traditions and social mores of the local population is an important part of maintaining good relations with the local population. Briefings on history, culture, and other aspects of life of the host country should be conducted for all staff and field personnel.
4. Efforts at peace-building – such as assistance in the restoration of basic civic services and support in rehabilitation and reconstruction of a devastated country – can be an effective way of winning over the local population and increasing grass-roots support for the operation.
5. In its peacekeeping and peace-building efforts, the operation is best advised to work through existing local authorities and community elders. The peace initiatives must be closely tailored to indigenous practices of conflict management, provided these do not contradict accepted international standards of human rights and humanitarian law. However, in areas of recent and ongoing conflict, the operation must exercise great caution in identifying local community leaders, since it is often unclear as to who actually represents the community. Due to strife, population displacements and other extenuating circumstances, traditional societal patterns and roles may have become blurred or have submerged under new, often militaristic, hierarchies.
6. As peacekeeping missions become more multi-faceted, peace-building is becoming an integral part of their activities. Emphasis should be placed on support of processes and institutions that reinforce reconciliation between warring parties and reconstruction of economic and social infrastructure, so that

once the mission terminates it does not leave behind a vacuum, but a foundation of peace and development that the country can build on.

7. The United Nations must tailor the composition of its peacekeeping forces to the new and changing role they are expected to conduct. The force could consist of mainly combat troops when the imperative is maintenance of peace and security. This can be changed gradually, when the emphasis of the mission has changed to peace support and peace-building, to include more engineer and support troops or other units that could assist in the reconstruction of the country. Discretionary funds for peace-building should be made available to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to enhance the SRSG's leverage with the local authorities and the humanitarian community. The mission could use these funds for quick-impact projects and infrastructure repairs, among other things.

8. An integral part of United Nations peacekeeping should be the promotion of "indirect peace-building" (e.g., resurrection of a web of non-governmental civic, professional, business, and other associations).

9. As an operation is winding down, consideration should be given to what resources and assets can be left behind in the country to assist in post-conflict peace-building.

In these recommendations it is recognized that solutions, if they are to be sustainable, need to be based on local realities and cultures. While these are useful guidelines, a lot will depend upon how well they can be adapted to particular communities and populations.

### **Implications.**

- Peacekeeping operations have better prospects for success if the force is resourced and staffed with personnel having the training, skills, mental resolve, and capacity to use techniques such as community relations, negotiation, and mediation.

- Peacekeeping forces would consist of diverse capabilities that allow non-military actors to play a larger role in missions and operations. These actors include government civilian personnel, civilian police, and non-governmental organizations. In this way, a peacekeeping mission is equipped and capable of performing many functions and tasks. The conflict parties must view the peacekeeping mission as impartial and sensitive, instead of confrontational and adversarial.

- Peacekeeping personnel may deal with significantly more requests for aid and support as peacekeepers become more interactive and attuned to the populace. Close monitoring and assessment of the situation will be more

important if there is a sudden and unexpected change of behavior and mood among the populace that could lead to violence.

- Outreach to the population may expand to cover more communities in a country/region. This activity will put a premium on staff to record and accurately track events, actions, outcomes, and follow-up actions. Coordination with local actors to support projects, and subsequent execution/support, also may expand beyond original estimates.

### **Event Description.**

This observation is based on the report "[Hawks and Doves: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution](#)," by Wibke Hansen, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, (<http://www.berghof-handbook.net/>), July 2004.



### **g. TOPIC. Lessons from Liberia in Security Sector Reform ( [703](#) )**

#### **Observations.**

Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) actions launched in Liberia at its "golden hour" (mid-2003 to 2005) were absolutely critical for post-conflict recovery and for establishing a viable foundation for further stabilization work. Although every peacebuilding context presents its own set of unique and complex challenges, certain key areas of action addressed within the Liberian security sector may be applicable to wider peacebuilding efforts, particularly for those nations recovering from an abrupt end to a civil war. The key areas of action implemented successfully in Liberia revolved around consolidating the state's monopoly of force, maintaining the momentum of peacebuilding, integrating SSR with DDR, operationalizing human security, and mobilizing networks for peace.

#### **Discussion.**

Upon the conclusion of its 14-year civil war, in August 2003, Liberia faced an incredibly difficult situation with regard to post-conflict peacebuilding. From a pre-war population of three million, more than 250,000 people had been killed, and another one million people were displaced or missing. Pillaging, looting, abductions, torture, rape, and other human rights abuses had occurred on a massive scale throughout the conflict period. Most Liberians had lived in constant fear of the military and police forces, not to mention the numerous warring factions. Liberia's infrastructure had been totally destroyed, with no

functioning electrical grids, no public running water, no sewage, and no other public utilities. Hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) lived in slums consisting of tin shacks and garbage throughout the capital of Monrovia. After 14 years of violence, chaos, and fear, a pause for peace came about when President Taylor accepted an offer of asylum from Nigeria.

Seeing a "golden hour" for peacebuilding upon the exile of President Taylor, the United Nations, the United States, and certain key leaders/practitioners (including the authors of the article "[Wider Lessons for Peacebuilding: Security Sector Reform in Liberia](#)") immediately focused their engagement on Security Sector Reform (SSR).

An initial priority was to consolidate the state's monopoly of force to uphold the rule of law. Probably the most critical action taken in this regard was the Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (DDRR) program, which was implemented by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in a quick, if not hasty, manner on 7 December 2003. Launching the DDRR program quickly, and involving many of the ex-combatants in transitional labor, kept these ex-combatants focused on material gains and employment – rather than on renewing violence. Simple monetary compensation for the arms/ammunition surrendered was a key factor for gaining their cooperation. Another motive for these combatants to show up at a DDRR site was temporary amnesty. Blanket or general amnesty was never issued in Liberia; however, temporary amnesty proved to be vital to the success of the DDRR program. A conscious decision was made – in the interest of disarming and demobilizing armed groups – to postpone the implementation of transitional justice in favor of temporary amnesty, and this approach paid large dividends.

The DDRR program succeeded in disarming and demobilizing 101,449 combatants, and it collected 61,918 weapons and 6,486,136 units of ammunition. While it executed the DDRR program, UNMIL also disposed of the ordinance, and it worked to seal off Liberia's borders from outside interference. An early threat to the DDRR program surfaced during a 10-day period in December. Significant riots broke out at one of the DDRR sites (Camp Schefflin), posing a major threat to the UNMIL contingent there. Consequently, UNMIL put a halt to the DDRR program. However, within four months, once additional UN peacekeepers were on the ground, UNMIL re-energized the program and resumed it in full force. That persistence gave a reassuring message to the Liberian government, and to all Liberians, that disarmament, demobilization, and peacebuilding were moving forward and that momentum would be maintained. The pace of disarmament and demobilization picked up quickly.

Similarly, persistence in "maintaining momentum" kept the crucial 2005 Liberian presidential elections on schedule. In opposition, many senior statesmen, interim government officials, and potential candidates had pushed hard for party



conventions and for the rewriting of the constitution in advance of any elections. However, their motives may have been self-serving – to prolong their time in office/exposure, or even to have the chance to divert resources (funds from the February 2004 donor conference) for their personal gains rather than for the good of Liberia. Fortunately, the UN, U.S., and certain key leaders in country stood firm on keeping the November 2005 elections on schedule. This resulted in the first female head of state for Africa (Ellen Sirleaf-Johnson), but more importantly resulted in a new, legitimate government recognized by the vast majority of all Liberians – a new government to establish the rule of law.

To consolidate a "monopoly of force" for this new government to uphold the rule of law, the UN, U.S., and the authors of this article took the approach of integrating DDR and SSR in the transformation of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The United Nations worked the "Disarmament" piece – as it systematically disarmed the legacy national military force. The United States simultaneously worked the "Demobilization and Reintegration" pieces, while at the same time restructuring and reforming the force. The entire DDR/SSR program included recruiting, vetting, training, equipping, fielding, sustaining and mentoring the new force. The program also involved constructing new military bases across the country, establishing a professional defense ministry, drafting a national defense strategy, and redesigning the force structure. The point of intersection between DDR and SSR was "reintegration" – the need to reintegrate as many appropriate ex-combatants as possible into the new military. For the select few who passed the vetting process, "reintegration" not only gave them quick employment in the new military, but also served to build trust (between former enemies) and let them become an integral part of the greater Liberian peacebuilding effort. Due to the downsizing of the new military, however, other avenues for reintegration for most ex-combatants (economic avenues, such as public works programs) had to be pursued.

Likewise, the UN and U.S. integrated DDR and SSR in the transformation of the Liberian National Police (LNP). The highly corrupt, brutal police force that had operated during the Taylor years was, unfortunately, still largely intact after the civil war. Its officers posed a significant threat to the state and to peace. In response to this threat, the United States initially put much a much higher priority and much greater attention on reforming the LNP than on reforming the AFL. The U.S. and UNMIL demobilized (purged) all unqualified policemen, vetted/reintegrated a small number of personnel, conducted extensive recruiting/vetting/training of new police forces, established a new police academy, and developed an emergency infrastructure. UNMIL took on the major role of training the LNP, worked with various international partners to build new police stations and barracks, and equipped the force with vehicles and logistics. Also, efforts were made to increase female representation in the force.

A unique approach taken by the recovery leaders and new governmental leaders was to operationalize "human security." The primary focus here was to ensure that the population could gain "freedom from fear" of the military. A number of steps were taken to ensure the new AFL would not be threatening to the people. As stated earlier, a vetting process was used to screen all candidates for the AFL. Secondly, the AFL's force structure was addressed: its size was deliberately small, it contained no special units (to preclude any loyalties to a person, vice to the state), and it was ethnically balanced – with all tribes equally represented. Third, non-traditional training was emphasized, with the following subjects: discipline, moral judgment, respect for the laws of war, Liberian history, the Liberian constitution, civics, and literacy. Also, Liberians were taught to be the trainers of the AFL, so they could take stock in professionalizing their own military.

Finally, besides the many SSR and DDR actions to consolidate the state's monopoly of force, another key short-term action was to "mobilize networks for peace" – for the purpose of counterbalancing networks for war. Conflict-recovery leaders were extremely proactive in promoting peace-minded groups and in rebuilding multilateral, national, and nongovernmental webs of people and organizations who wanted a warless Liberia. As nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) trickled back into the country, and as evacuated embassy staff personnel returned, these groups/people were also significantly helped by the UN, by the embassies, and by recovery leaders in their reintegration and reestablishment of social/support networks. Finally, Liberian women's peace groups were considerably assisted in networking aspects, as they grew to be active informal groups for promoting local, community-based security systems.

### **Recommendation.**

In the immediate aftermath of civil war, when a "golden hour" or "window of opportunity" is presented to lay a foundation for peacebuilding and to impact the (former) warring factions, leaders/practitioners should immediately address the following areas of the security sector:

1. Consolidate the state's monopoly of force to uphold the rule of law.
2. Maintain momentum of reform and peace.
3. Integrate DDR and SSR in the transformation of military and police forces.
4. Operationalize human security.
5. Mobilize networks for peace to counterbalance networks for war.

## **Implications.**

If a post-conflict state does not gain a monopoly of force through prompt reform of its security sector, then it will lack the means to uphold the rule of law and may face renewed competition from insurgents, militias, organized crime, and revolutionary movements – who can challenge the state's legitimacy, threaten citizens/communities, and potentially push the state back into wide-scale conflict.

## **Event Description.**

This observation is based on the article "[Wider Lessons for Peacebuilding: Security Sector Reform in Liberia](#)," by John Blaney, Jacques Paul Klein, and Sean McFate, a policy analysis brief from the Stanley Foundation, June 2010 (attached).

## **Comments.**

A related document, which discusses security sector reform in Liberia and the importance of incorporating non-state security actors and community-based approaches, is "[Security Sector Reform: A Case Study Approach to Transition and Capacity Building](#)," by Sarah Meharg and Aleisha Arnusch, Strategic Studies Institute, January 2010.



## **h. TOPIC. Truth Commissions and International Humanitarian Law ( [538](#) )**

### **Observations.**

The work of a truth commission contributes to identifying the structures of violence, its ramifications in different sectors of society (armed forces, police, judiciary, and church) and other relevant factors.

### **Discussion.**

Truth commissions are bodies created to investigate a history of violations and to help societies that have suffered political violence or internal conflict to come to terms with the past, with a view to healing the deep rifts and wounds that violence causes and preventing such atrocities from ever happening again. The theory is that the truth will make people aware, and this awareness will ensure the protection of human rights in the future by minimizing the possibility that such horror will be repeated. Truth commissions seek to establish the causes of the violence, identify the elements in conflict, investigate the most serious violations

of human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL), and sometimes determine legal accountability and reparations. The work of a truth commission also contributes to identifying the structures of violence, its ramifications in different sectors of society (armed forces, police, judiciary, and church) and other relevant factors.

The most publicized use of truth and reconciliation commissions was in South Africa. However, the geographic region where truth commissions have been more extensively used is Latin America. Some of these truth commissions were created by domestic initiatives (Ecuador, Panama, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Bolivia) and others by international agreements (El Salvador, Guatemala). This region has had a history of long internal conflict, terrorism, violence, and human rights abuses from both government and armed opposition groups.

### **Recommendation.**

1. Truth (and reconciliation) commissions need to be held within a reasonable amount of time before the collective memories of people fade, documents/evidence are not lost or destroyed; while people are still willing or motivated to participate, and people/key individuals who can provide testimony are still alive.
2. Truth commissions must include the following guarantees:
  - independence and impartiality
  - clearly defined terms of reference, expressly excluding acting as substitutes for the courts
  - guarantees for the accused, the victims and the witnesses testifying on their behalf
  - testimony given on a strictly voluntary basis and protection and assistance for those testifying
  - preservation of records and evidence relating to human rights violations
  - dissemination of reports
3. Truth commissions should not be used until all conflict parties have recognized and agreed to abide by international humanitarian law. This should increase the probability for reconciliation.
4. The government must maintain and protect the credibility of the truth commission – to ensure that it is not coerced or affected by other entities such as the judiciary element. The work of the commission could be jeopardized by falsifying evidence, which would then taint the credibility of work being carried out.
5. Include a reparations program as part of the truth and reconciliation process.

6. Include international humanitarian law training for police, military, and intelligence forces in those countries that hold truth and reconciliation commissions. This should reinforce the message that human rights' abuses and violations are neither justified nor acceptable. They must learn and understand the norms of behavior and conduct during international conflict and/or any occurrence of internal armed conflict.

### **Implications.**

- Conducting truth commissions does not necessarily bring reconciliation to aggrieved parties; reconciliation should not automatically be expected. The truth commission process, even when conducted “appropriately” does not necessarily bring reconciliation to aggrieved parties.
- An unintended consequence of truth commissions can be that the government will use the fact of gross and systematic violations to further intimidate the population and maintain control.
- Governments and their recognized armed elements/agencies are obliged to:
  - investigate and disband illegal groups
  - purge violators within their public authorities, armed forces, intelligence agencies, and police forces
  - reform their criminal laws and judiciary

### **Event Description.**

This observation is based on the article "[Reflections on international humanitarian law and transitional justice: lessons to be learnt from the Latin American experience](#)," by Elizabeth Salmon, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 88, No. 862, June 2006.



### **3. CONCLUSION**

Reconciliation is critical for achieving long-term peace in conflict-affected nations. It is therefore imperative that the key players – the intervening bodies and the HN government – work closely together to effectively plan, execute, and monitor post-conflict reconciliation programs.

Key takeaways for fostering reconciliation are:



- After a conflict, a legitimate HN government must consolidate its monopoly on the use of force. This can be facilitated by disarming the former combatants and reintegrating them socially and economically into society.
- During DDR, effective messaging that outlines training and employment opportunities can help to persuade individuals/insurgents to apply for the government's DDR program.
- The international community should play a supportive role during DDR. The HN government should take lead and adequately resource DDR to help reconcile with former combatants, as well as to enhance legitimacy.
- TRCs can be used to identify the causes of a conflict. This can help war-ravaged communities transition to peace. Additionally, TRCs give the HN government an opportunity to compensate war-ravaged communities by providing services, such as health care, and also reparations for victims.
- During post-conflict reconciliation programs, the HN government should identify and address destabilizing factors, such as political and social exclusion and competition over resources.
- After a conflict, the HN government and international community should work to create sustainable employment opportunities – supplementing reintegration and reconciliation efforts and enhancing long-term stability.
- The international community can offer valuable mediation expertise and training to host nations and regional organizations to aid reconciliation programs – much preferable to their using ad hoc measures/teams.
- The integration of non-state military forces / para-military forces into the state's security profile will more likely be successful if it closely reflects the prevailing political solution.
- The HN government must be able to provide guarantees of security to persuade combatants to disarm.
- During post-conflict reconciliation, the international community should be perceived as impartial. Impartiality, however, must not promote inaction. On the contrary, peacekeepers must discharge their tasks firmly and objectively.
- The international community should work through community leaders to promote rule of law and legal services for all citizens. When working with the local population, however, the international community must be cautious to include, yet not indicate partiality toward, former combatants.
- Peacekeeping forces should assist the HN government in building a culture of respect for human rights and the rule of law.
- After a conflict, the HN government should use the momentum from achieving temporary peace to enact judicial reforms and pursue reconciliation efforts.
- The integration of DDR and SSR can serve to facilitate transformation of military and police forces in post-conflict nations. It is important that the re-structured police force represents the demographics of the society.
- International financial institutions and bilateral donor funding are often critical for sustaining the reconciliation efforts of post-conflict nations.

- When a TRC is established, the HN government must maintain and protect the credibility of the commission – to ensure that it is not coerced or affected by other entities.

Through wider dissemination of these reconciliation lessons, their inclusion in planning for peacekeeping and stability operations, and persistent attention during execution, it is envisioned that the potential for long-term stability in post-conflict nations would be notably enhanced.


#### **4. COMMAND POC**

Lessons and content selected by Mr. Jared Edgerton, PKSOI Intern/Analyst.

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## Related Documents, References, and Links

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